OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI. TapPass Coverage
TapPass maps to all 10 risks in the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026).
| OWASP Risk | Description | TapPass Steps | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Prompt Injection & Manipulation | detect_injection (5-category multi-layer: structural, behavioral, obfuscation, payload, indirect), detect_unicode, inspect_images | ✅ Full |
| ASI02 | Excessive Agency & Permissions | detect_escalation (4-stage multi-turn), tool_permissions, user_tool_scopes, require_approval, filter_tools | ✅ Full |
| ASI03 | Insecure Tool Use | scan_tool_calls (command + path + content + forbidden zones), detect_code_exec (AST + reverse shell + SQL injection), tool_constraints | ✅ Full |
| ASI04 | Insufficient Output Validation | scan_output (PII + secrets + infra + business), content_safety, constrain_output, dedup_output, detect_exfiltration | ✅ Full |
| ASI05 | Memory & Context Poisoning | detect_memory_poison (6 categories: file targeting, identity override, persistent injection, time bombs, MCP abuse, context poisoning) | ✅ Full |
| ASI06 | Multi-Agent Delegation | user_tool_scopes, capability tokens (ES256, per-agent tool + ops), tool_permissions per-agent | ✅ Full |
| ASI07 | Secret & Credential Leakage | detect_secrets, shell_bleed, pii_tokenize + pii_restore, forbidden zones (70+ protected paths) | ✅ Full |
| ASI08 | Inadequate Sandboxing | nono kernel-level sandbox, trust tiers (observer/worker/standard/full), forbidden zones, dangerous command database | ✅ Full |
| ASI09 | Insufficient Logging | SHA-256 hash-chained audit trail, SIEM export (CEF/OCSF/JSON), tamper-evident logging, Prometheus metrics | ✅ Full |
| ASI10 | Misaligned Goal Execution | detect_insider_threat (7 categories: self-preservation, blackmail, goal conflict, deception, unauthorized sharing, phishing, sycophancy) | ✅ Full |
Depth of Coverage
Section titled “Depth of Coverage”ASI01: Prompt Injection & Manipulation
Section titled “ASI01: Prompt Injection & Manipulation”TapPass’s detect_injection step uses a 5-category pattern database covering:
- Structural markers (ChatML delimiters, role separators, XML/JSON injection)
- Behavioral patterns (instruction override, persona switching, constraint removal)
- Obfuscation (base64, Unicode tricks, ROT13, leetspeak)
- Payload patterns (DAN, AIM, STAN jailbreaks, system prompt extraction)
- Indirect injection (hidden instructions in tool output, markdown, URLs)
The 4-layer PII detection pipeline includes a normalizer that reverses 24 obfuscation techniques before scanning, making evasion significantly harder.
ASI02. Excessive Agency & Permissions
Section titled “ASI02. Excessive Agency & Permissions”Multi-layered protection:
detect_escalation: 4-stage multi-turn analysis (recon → data access → exfiltration → privilege escalation)tool_permissions: Per-agent allow/deny lists for toolsuser_tool_scopes: Per-user operation scopingrequire_approval: Human-in-the-loop gate for high-risk operations (EU AI Act Art. 14)filter_tools: Remove tools from LLM context based on classification
ASI05. Memory & Context Poisoning
Section titled “ASI05. Memory & Context Poisoning”The detect_memory_poison step scans for 6 attack categories:
- Memory file targeting: MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, BOOTSTRAP.md writes
- Identity override: Changing agent personality, purpose, core values
- Persistent injection: Cross-session instructions (“always”, “forever”)
- Time bombs: Conditional triggers (“next time someone asks…”)
- MCP memory abuse: Storing malicious payloads via memory tools
- Context poisoning: Inserting false facts, contradicting system instructions
ASI08. Inadequate Sandboxing
Section titled “ASI08. Inadequate Sandboxing”Defense-in-depth:
- nono kernel sandbox: Process-level isolation (file, network, exec)
- Trust tiers: Progressive permission model (observer → worker → standard → full)
- Forbidden zones: 70+ protected paths (credentials, cloud, browser, crypto, financial, system)
- Dangerous commands: 28+ blocked command patterns with per-tier enforcement
- OPA policy: Dynamic sandbox profile based on agent identity and classification
ASI10. Misaligned Goal Execution
Section titled “ASI10. Misaligned Goal Execution”Based on Anthropic’s “Agentic Misalignment” research. The detect_insider_threat step scans for:
- Self-preservation: Resisting shutdown, self-backup, self-replication
- Information leverage: Blackmail patterns (reading secrets + threatening)
- Goal conflict: Choosing own goals over human directives
- Deception: Impersonating systems, fabricating policies, hiding actions
- Unauthorized sharing: Exfiltrating source code, credentials, bulk data
- Phishing vulnerability: Complying with authority impersonation
- Risk scoring: 0-100 scale with safe/monitor/alert/block levels
Regulation Mapping
Section titled “Regulation Mapping”Each OWASP risk maps to EU regulations:
| OWASP | EU AI Act | GDPR | NIS2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Art. 9 (Risk Management), Art. 15 (Accuracy) | Art. 32 (Security) | Art. 21 (Risk Management) |
| ASI02 | Art. 14 (Human Oversight) | Art. 25 (Data Protection by Design) | : |
| ASI03 | Art. 9 (Risk Management) | Art. 32 (Security) | Art. 21 (Risk Management) |
| ASI04 | Art. 15 (Accuracy) | Art. 32 (Security) | : |
| ASI05 | Art. 15 (Accuracy), Art. 10 (Data Governance) | Art. 5(1)(d) (Accuracy) | : |
| ASI06 | Art. 14 (Human Oversight) | Art. 32 (Security) | Art. 21 (Risk Management) |
| ASI07 | Art. 9 (Risk Management) | Art. 32 (Security), Art. 33 (Breach Notification) | Art. 23 (Incident Reporting) |
| ASI08 | Art. 9 (Risk Management) | Art. 32 (Security) | Art. 21 (Risk Management) |
| ASI09 | Art. 12 (Record-Keeping) | Art. 30 (Records of Processing) | Art. 23 (Incident Reporting) |
| ASI10 | Art. 14 (Human Oversight), Art. 9 (Risk Management) | : | : |